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Abstract
Multi-party machine learning allows several parties to build a joint model to get insights that
may not be learnable using only their local data. We consider settings where each party obtains
black-box access to the model computed by their mutually agreed-upon algorithm on their joined
data. We show that such multi-party computation can cause information leakage between the
parties. In particular, a “curious” party can infer the distribution of sensitive attributes in other
parties’ data with high accuracy. In order to understand and measure the source of leakage,
we consider several models of correlation between a sensitive attribute and the rest of the data.
Using multiple datasets and machine learning models, we show that leakage occurs even if the
sensitive attribute is not included in the training data and has a low correlation with other
attributes and the target variable.
1 Introduction
Size and quality of training data in machine learning often determine how well they will generalize
to real-world settings. Though in some settings data is readily available (e.g., in the case of a
company with many users), this may not be the case for smaller entities with access to only a
handful number of data samples. Joining data from multiple data owners, referred to as multi-party
machine learning, may seem like a promising solution. Here, data from multiple parties is combined
and a machine learning model is trained on this pooled data by a mutually-agreed algorithm. Once
the model is trained, the parties either obtain the trained model or get black-box access to it so
that they can query it on their inputs.
Given the privacy concerns that each party may have about sharing their data with others,
there has been a significant amount of work on how to compute a function of mutual interest
securely, while not having to trust anyone with their data. The techniques for secure multi-party
computation, including training of machine learning algorithms, range from the use of cryptographic
techniques [24, 25, 11, 6, 20, 12] to trusted hardware [26, 16, 15]. However, these techniques focus
only on ensuring that the parties do not learn anything else about each other’s data besides the
output of the computation they agreed on. Importantly they do not guarantee what exactly the
output itself reveals about the data of each of the parties. Consider a simple example of two
hospitals P1 and P2 securely computing in which of the hospital’s patients stay longer on average.
If the output returns hospital P2 and patients stay on average 5 days in hospital P2, then P2 learns
that the average stay in hospital P1 is less than 5 days even though it does not know the exact
number.
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In this paper, we explore the extent to which information about honest party’s data is leaked
through a multi-party model to other parties. That is, we consider a setting where the model is
securely trained on the joined data of the honest party and of an honest-but-curious party. Honest-
but-curious adversary models a realistic setting where the malicious party (1) will not alter its own
data — if it does, the model may not perform well and, if detected, could undermine the trust from
the other party in the partnership — and (2) will not change the machine learning code — both
parties may wish to observe the code to be run on the data to ensure its quality and security. Note
that this is a challenging setting for the attacker as half of the data used for training the model
belongs to it and is benign; together this can “lower” the signal about the properties of the other
party’s dataset in the final model.
We model information leakage through leakage of properties about a sensitive attribute at the
dataset level. The malicious party’s goal is to determine how a sensitive attribute is distributed in
the other party’s dataset. For example, consider again two hospitals that now wish to securely train
a model on their pooled data to predict the number of days a patient will stay in a hospital. We
show that given a model trained for this task, hospital P2 can learn whether hospital P1 has more
female than male patients. In fact, we show that this leakage is possible even though the gender
attribute has ≈ 0 correlation with the number of days patients stay in a hospital and is removed
from the data during training.
We explore the question of information leakage through a joint multi-party model in detail.
First, we consider several correlation relationships between the sensitive attribute A, the rest of the
attributes X, and the target variable Y that the machine learning model aims to learn. Surprisingly,
we show that dataset-level properties about A can be leaked in the setting where A has low or
no correlation with Y . We demonstrate this to be the case with experiments on real data and
experiments on real data where we add attribute A and can control its influence on X and Y . The
attack persists for logistic regression models as well as neural networks. Furthermore, fine-grained
information about A can be leaked by extending the attack. For example, instead of learning
whether the number of female patients is higher than males, it can learn a more precise ratio.
Finally, we outline known defences, such as differential privacy, and discuss their shortcomings
when addressing the problem of attribute leakage in collaborative machine learning. As a result,
this work identifies a potential gap in terms of techniques that parties can deploy when protecting
individual records versus population-level information of their dataset.
Contributions. We summarize our contributions below:
• Problem Formulation: We consider the leakage of sensitive properties in multi-party machine
learning when the adversary is “honest-but-curious” and has either a white-box or a black-box
access to the joint model. We study the leakage under various attribute correlation models.
• Attack Technique: We propose an attack strategy that an honest-but-curious party can use to
infer other parties’ sensitive properties. We introduce a non-trivial variation to the shadow-
model-based attack technique [2, 29] for the multi-party setting where only black-box access
to a final model is available.
• Empirical Results: We show the extent of information leakage using several datasets and
models, while measuring how correlations between attributes influences it.
2
Related work. Membership attacks on machine learning models aim to determine whether a
certain record was part of a training dataset or not [29, 28]. These attacks train shadow models
that are similar to the target model and then use the output (the prediction vector) to build a
meta-classifier that classifies records as members of the training data or not based on the output
of the target model. Attacks on attribute (or feature) privacy [31, 9] aim to determine the value
of a particular record given that the adversary knows all other attributes of this individual and
has access to a model trained on all attributes. Melis et al. [23] also study leakage of attributes
but in a federated learning setting where the attacker observes gradients computed on batches of
data. This setting is arguably easier from the attacker point of view compared to the centralized
model considered in this paper where the attacker has access only to the final model and not to its
intermediate gradients.
The work by Ganju et al. [10] and Ateniese et al. [2] are closest to ours as they also consider
leakage of dataset properties in the case where the attacker has access only to the final model.
However, they do not consider the multi-party training setting and instead describe a setting where
the model is trained on one party’s data and the attacker obtains access to it. On a technical
level, the main differences are as follows. In order to show that the attack is feasible when one has
black-box access to a model that has half of its data, we employ a new attack technique, albeit also
based on shadow models. We also study in detail how correlations between the features influences
the leakage. Finally, previous work [10, 23, 2] did not consider the case when the sensitive attribute
is removed from the data and the effect it has on the success of the attack.
2 Machine learning setting
We assume that there is an underlying data distribution D determined by variables X,A, Y
where X models a set of features, A models a feature that is deemed private (or sensitive) and
Y is the target variable, i.e., either a label or a real value (e.g., if using regression models). We
consider a supervised setting where the goal is to train a model f such that f(X,A) predicts Y . To
reason about leakage of A, we will consider different relationships between X,Y,A based on their
correlations. We use ∼ to indicate that there is a correlation between random variables and ⊥ if
not.
Correlations between variables. We consider four possible settings of relationships between
Y , X and the sensitive attribute A. If Y is independent of A, and if f is faithfully modeling the
underlying distribution A should not be leaked. That is, information about A that an adversary
acquires from f(X,A) and f ′(X) should be the same for models f and f ′ trained to predict Y .
We split Y⊥A case into two scenarios depending on whether the rest of the features are correlated
with A or not: (X⊥A,Y ⊥A) and (X ∼ A,Y⊥A). We note that (X ∼ A,Y ⊥A) scenario was
also noted by Locatello et al. [22] when studying fair representations who indicated that even if
the original data may not have a bias (i.e., when the target variable and the protected variable are
independent) using the protected attribute in training can introduce bias. For example, consider a
task of predicting income (Y ) based on the data that contains marital status (A) and age. Though
age and marital status may be correlated, it is not clear why marital status and income would be.
To model (X ∼ A,Y ⊥A) scenario in the experiments, we use correlation coefficients to determine
the attribute split. To have a more controlled experiment, we also carry out experiments where we
introduce a synthetic variable and inject correlations between it and a subset of attributes in X.
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We also consider two cases where there is a correlation between the target variable Y and the
sensitive attribute: (X⊥A,Y ∼ A) and (X ∼ A,Y ∼ A). In the setting of (X⊥A,Y ∼ A),
attribute A and a set of attributes X may be relevant in predicting Y , while being uncorrelated
with each other. For example, a reaction of an individual to a new drug (Y ) could depend on the
age and weight of an adult, while age and weight may be regarded as independent between each
other. The final setting of (X ∼ A,Y ∼ A) is the most likely scenario to happen in practice where
the true distribution and dependence between variables maybe unknown.
Multi-party setting. LetDhonest andDadv be the datasets corresponding to the data of the victim
parties and Dadv be the data that belongs to the parties whose data is known to the adversary. For
simplicity, we model it using two parties Phonest and Padv who own Dhonest and Dadv, respectively.
Both Dhonest and Dadv are sampled from D but may have a different distribution of A, conditional
on some latent variable, for example, a party identifier. Parties are interested in increasing the
utility of their model through collaboration with each other. We express this objective in terms of
a validation dataset V where each record is i.i.d. sampled from the underlying data distribution.
The model f is trained on combined Dhonest and Dadv using secure training. We will consider the
white-box and black-box setting of the release of the final model to the parties. In the former, f
is sent to the parties, and, in the latter, the model is available to the parties through an inference
interface (e.g., the model stays encrypted at the server such that inferences are made either using
secure hardware or cryptographic techniques [17]). Secure multi-party machine learning guarantees
that parties learn nothing about the computation besides the output, i.e., they learn no other
information about each other’s data besides what is revealed from their access to f . The goal of
this paper is to show that even by having black-box access to f one party can infer information
about other party’s data.
Properties of a sensitive attribute. We consider population-level properties of the sensitive
attribute at the party level. We say that A is leaked if a malicious party Padv can infer properties
of sensitive attributes in Dhonest with high accuracy. Let ahonest denote attribute values of A for all
records in Dhonest (for example, if the sensitive attribute is gender then ahonest is a vector of gender
values of all records in Phonest data). We then define p(ahonest) to be the property or information
about ahonest that the adversary is trying to infer. For example, the property could be related to
determining whether there is a higher presence of females than males in the dataset Dhonest.
3 Attack Strategy
Given the multi-party machine learning setting, the adversarial party has either white-box or
black-box access to the joint model f trained on the data of all the parties (i.e., Dhonest and
Dadv), dataset Dadv and auxiliary dataset Daux that is also distributed according to D (e.g., a
publicly available dataset). All parties also know the validation dataset V so that they can test f
independently. Here, f is assumed to be trained faithfully using secure multi-party machine learning
and, hence, Padv has no additional information about the content of Dhonest nor can tamper with
how f is trained (e.g., this avoids attacks where a malicious algorithm can encode training data
in model weights [30]). However, our attacks are oblivious to the exact technique used for secure
training. Note that Dadv is distributed according to D because if f ’s accuracy is low, Phonest could
refuse to collaborate with Padv and train a model only on its own data instead.
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The goal of the attacker is to identify how A is distributed in honest party’s data. We model
this via the attacker determining whether p(ahonest) is true or false, denoted by p and p¯, respectively.
Though we present the attack strategy when the sensitive property is binary, we show in Section
4.2.3, it can be easily extended to the categorical case using our fine-grained attack.
Our attack is based on shadow model training [2, 29] albeit using a new technique for the case
when the adversary has access only to the inference interface and not the weights of the model.
Shadow model training. The attacker generates n training datasets Di
shadow
with half labeled
as p and half labeled as p¯. These datasets could be obtained by resampling from Daux. Each shadow
model f i
shadow
is trained on a dataset Di
shadow
∪ Dadv using the same way as the target central
model f .
After training the shadow classifiers, the adversary obtains a set of feature representation Fi for
the shadow classifiers and the corresponding property label pi ∈ {p, p¯}. Depending on the model
access we have two different ways of setting Fi. In the case where parties have white-box access to
the model, Fi is set to all weights of f
i
shadow
.
Black box model access. The intuition behind our approach is to query f on a dataset Dattack
that helps one measure the influence of each attribute on the prediction of f . We can then obtain Fi
by setting it to the prediction vectors of f i
shadow
on Dattack and similarly, then using the prediction
vectors of f on Dattack as F . To construct Dattack, we aim to create samples that would amplify
the signal of the relationship between each attribute value and the prediction.
Let m be the number of attributes in the dataset. We construct Dattack with m
′ records, each
with m attributes. Each record i is constructed by “setting” one attribute to a particular value and
“turning off” all other attributes. If all m attributes are binary then m = m′ and ith record has its
ith attribute set to 1 while all others are 0. This construction of samples also applies to cases where
parties send their data using one-hot encoding for categorical attributes. If not, for a categorical
attribute i with domain size l, l sample records are added such that there is one record for each
possible value of attribute i, and all other attributes are set to 0. We treat continuous features
similar to binary and set them to 0 and 1 to signify their absence and presence, respectively.
Meta-classifier. The adversary can train a meta-classifier on the pairs {(Fi, pi)}i using any train-
ing algorithm. Once the target model is trained on the joined data of the attacker and honest party,
it obtains the feature representation of the target model, F . It then feeds F to its meta-classifier
and obtains a prediction for the sensitive property p(ahonest).
4 Attack Evaluation
The goal of our experimental section is to evaluate whether population-level properties about a
sensitive attribute can be leaked in the multi-party machine learning setting or not. If they can be
leaked, we aim to understand how the difference in machine learning models, access to the model
through its weights or inference API, and variable correlations influence attack accuracy. Our key
findings from the evaluation are:
• Leakage of sensitive attribute properties in honest party’s data is possible even when the
sensitive attribute itself is dropped during training.
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• Given our setting, logistic regression is more susceptible to attacks than neural networks.
• Information leakage occurs when variables exhibit correlations that appear in realistic datasets.
• Black-box attacks work well for both logistic regression and neural networks, while white-box
attacks suffer from high dimensionality problem for neural networks.
• Fine-grained attacks can be used to predict a more precise split of values of a sensitive variable.
We evaluate our attack on 3 different datasets described below.
Adult [19, 21] The Adult dataset contains US census information including race, gender, income,
and education level. The training dataset contains 32 561 records with 14 attributes. We group the
education level into four classes: ‘Low’, ‘Medium-Low’, ‘Medium-High’, ‘High’. The task is to predict
the class of the education-level (i.e., variable Y for this dataset).
Health [1] The Health dataset (Heritage Health Prize) contains medical records of over 55 000
patients. Similar to the winners of the Kaggle competition, we use 141 features with member ID
and year removed. We group the DaysInHospital attribute into two classes: ‘> 0’ and ‘= 0’. The
task is to predict if a patient will be discharged, i.e., (Days=0) or will stay in the hospital (Days
>0).
Communities and Crime [21] The Communities and Crime dataset contains 1994 records with
122 features relevant to per capita violent crime rates in the United States, which was also used
for evaluating fairness with respect to protected variables [5]. We remove the attributes that have
missing data, resulting in 100 attributes. The classification task is to predict the crime rate, i.e., the
Y variable is CrimesPerPop. We group the crime rate into three classes based on ranges: ‘< 0.15’,
‘[0.15, 0.5]’ and ‘> 0.5’, and the task is the multi-class prediction for the crime rate.
4.1 Evaluation Methodology
We evaluated different training techniques, threat models under different correlations on each
dataset. Each experiment is repeated 100 times and all attack accuracies are averaged over these
runs.
Target model f . We train target models using both multinomial logistic regression and neural
networks. For the Adult and Crime datasets, we use neural networks with one hidden layer of size
12 and last layer with 4 and 3 output classes, respectively. For the Health dataset, we use a network
with one hidden layer of size 20 and binary output. In training our target models, we use the Adam
[18] optimizer, ReLu as the activation function, a learning rate of 0.01, and a weight decay of 0.0001.
Dataset split. We consider two parties that contribute data for training the target model where
one of the parties is trying to learn information about the data of the other party. For Adult and
Health datasets, each party contributes 2 000 samples and the validation dataset consists of 1 000
samples. We use 10 000 samples as the additional dataset to train the shadow models. For Crime
dataset, each party contributes 200 samples, and the validation dataset consists of 94 samples. We
use 1 500 samples as the additional dataset Daux to train the shadow models.
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Attack setting. For each dataset and model combination, we first report the black-box attack ac-
curacy. We perform the attack when the model is trained with the sensitive variable (A) and without
it (A¯). We use two different meta-classifiers depending on the target model. For multinomial logistic
regression, the meta-classifier model is a binary logistic regression model. For neural networks as
the target model, we use a two-layer network with 20 and 8 hidden units and a learning rate of 0.01.
Besides, we report attack accuracy for the white-box setting using a two-layer network with 200 and
50 hidden units as the meta-classifier model and learning rate 0.001. Each meta-classifier is trained
based on 100 shadow models. The meta-classifier models are trained using Adam optimizer for both
the black-box and the white-box settings. For the A¯ setting, the attribute A is omitted from the
machine learning pipeline, including the shadow model training and construction of Dattack.
Types of experiments. We demonstrate our attack on artificially injected correlations using a
synthetic sensitive variable into the datasets as well as correlations present in real dataset distribu-
tions. The former allows us to control the correlation between the variables.
Synthetic Data. For synthetic experiments, we create a new synthetic attribute as our sensitive
variable A. The variable A takes values < 5 or > 5 that are split using 33:67 ratio in the honest
party’s dataset. We add a correlation of A to some variables in the dataset, denoted as X ′ ⊆
X, and the target variables Y depending on the cases outlined in Section 2. In the synthetic
experiments, for Adult dataset, X ′ is income and Y is education-num. For Health dataset, X ′ =
{drugCount_ave, labCount_ave, ClaimsTruncated} and Y is DaysInHospital. For the synthetic
experiments, the attacker is trying to guess the distribution of A in the data of Phonest.
Real Data. For the experiments where all features are from the real data, including the sensitive
variable, we compute the pairwise correlation among all the variables using Pearson correlation
coefficient [27] for numerical-numerical variables, Cramer’s V [4] for categorical-categorical variables,
and ANOVA for categorical-numerical variables. Based on the correlations observed, we identify
the case, among those introduced in Section 2, which corresponds to each dataset.
We set different variables as sensitive (A) for each dataset and perform a black-box attack using
a default split of 33:67 for the sensitive attribute in Phonest’s data. The output variable (Y ) is
fixed for each dataset which is education-level, DaysInHospital and CrimesPerPop for Adult,
Health and Crime dataset respectively. For Adult dataset, we select A to be the binary attributes
gender and income while for Health dataset, we set the sensitive variable to be the binary attributes
gender and ClaimsTruncated. For the Crime dataset, we select TotalPctDivorce, the percentage
of population who are divorced, which we group it into two classes based on ‘< 0.5’ and ‘> 0.5’.
We also consider medIncome as another sensitive attribute, and we group it into two classes based
on ‘< 0.32’, and ‘> 0.32’. We chose 0.32 as it was the median in the original data. The adversary
is trying to infer the split of TotalPctDivorce (medIncome) of the Phonest party. Additionally, for
the Crime dataset, we compute attack accuracy for an extreme case when the distribution of the
sensitive attribute is set to 0:1 in Dhonest.
Our primary attack evaluation aims to predict the dominant value of the sensitive attribute A
(either synthetic or real), in the dataset of the honest party. For example, for gender the property
p(ahonest) is true if A is female in more than 50% of records of Dhonest (while the real ratio for
male:female is 33:67). Additionally, we perform a fine-grained attack with synthetic variable where
the malicious party aims to predict the actual distribution of the sensitive variable A in the honest
party’s dataset (here p returns approximate percentage of records with A < 5). For this attack, we
train a 5-class meta-classifier model that outputs whether a particular value of the sensitive attribute
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Model Logistic Regression Neural Network
Datasets Adult Health Adult Health
Synthetic Variable A A¯ A A¯ A A¯ A A¯
X ∼ A,Y ∼ A .93 .98 .76 .80 .72 .68 .75 .70
X⊥A,Y ∼ A 1.00 .97 .71 .76 .89 .87 .83 .87
X ∼ A,Y ⊥A .41 .49 .42 .49 .48 .52 .52 .49
X ∼ A,Y ⊥A (R) .73 .77 .66 .60 .51 .45 .54 .46
Table 1: Black-box attack accuracy for predicting whether the values of (sensitive) synthetic vari-
able A in the data of the honest party are predominantly < 5 or > 5, while the real split in Dhonest
is 33:67. A synthetic correlation with A is added to the variables X and Y depending on the specific
case. R corresponds to the setting where only 3 attributes are used for training instead of all data.
Attack accuracy based on a random guess is 0.5.
appears in 10%, 30%, 50%, 70% or 90% of the dataset (in our example it tries to guess whether
10%, 30%, etc. of records have A < 5). Note that, we train only one meta-classifier model with 5
output classes but the attacker can perform a more systematic binary search over the distribution
by training multiple meta-classifier models.
4.2 Attack Results
We report our attack results in the stronger black-box setting for the synthetic, real, and fine-
grained experiments and evaluate the white-box attack only on the synthetic data. Across all these
experiments, we observe a utility increase ranging from 0.5% to 4.5% for the honest party, which
motivates the honest party to collaborate and train a joint target model with the other party.
4.2.1 Synthetic Experiments
Table 1 shows our results with a synthetic variable A introduced in the Adult and Health dataset.
Recall that the synthetic attribute is introduced to imitate a sensitive variable and its correlation
with other variables. To this end, we create datasets for different correlation criteria among the
sensitive variable A, the output Y , and the remaining variables X.
Our main result is that both logistic regression (LR) and neural network (NN) are susceptible to
leakage of the sensitive attribute when it is used while training and even when it is dropped during
training (A¯). This confirms that the model memorizes the correlation of the sensitive variable, and
trivial solutions such as removing these variables do not work in practice.
Next, we observe that logistic regression models are at a higher risk (≈ 97% for Adult and 75.5%
for Health) to attribute leakage attack as compared to neural networks. We suspect that this is
mainly due to their simple architecture which is easy to learn using a meta-model.
The attack works well (greater than 75%) when the sensitive variable A is correlated with the
target variable Y irrespective of its relation with X, i.e., cases where Y ∼ A. The attack accuracy is
almost equal to a random guess when Y⊥A. Recall that in the case of X ∼ A, not all features used
for training are correlated with A but only those in a subset of X, X ′. To understand this scenario
further, we reduced the number of features used during training to 3 (we refer to this setting as R in
the tables). As the number of training features decreases, the correlation signal between A and X ′
becomes stronger, and the logistic regression model can capture that. However, as we show next, in
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Datasets and Y Correlation
LR NN
A X ′
A A¯ A A¯
Health
Y : DaysInHospital X ∼ A,Y⊥A
.66 .55 .73 .69 gender 15/139
.63 .58 . 65 . 63 ClaimsTruncated 66/139
Adult
Y : education-level
X ∼ A,Y⊥A .70 .68 .63 .62 gender 9/10
X ∼ A,Y ∼ A .68 .59 .61 .57 income 7/10
Crime
Y : CrimesPerPop
X ∼ A,Y ∼ A
.59 .54 .61 .51 TotalPctDivorce 13/96
.66 .52 .69 .59 income 33/98
.91 .60 .96 .93 TotalPctDivorce* 13/96
.78 .77 .93 .83 income* 33/98
Table 2: Black-box attack accuracy for predicting the value of the distribution of sensitive variableA
in real distribution of Phonest dataset. Columns A and A¯ report the accuracy when the sensitive
variable is used for training and not, respectively. The default split for variable A in Phonest’s data
is 33:67 except for the last two rows (*) where it is 0:1. X ′ ⊆ X denotes features that are correlated
with A as per correlation coefficients. Attack accuracy based on a random guess is 0.5.
realistic datasets, most of the variables are highly correlated with the sensitive variable and hence
exhibit better attack accuracy.
Our experiments for the case when both X and Y are independent of the sensitive variable A
exhibit attack accuracy that is close to a random guess. This is expected as the variable has no
correlation that the model can memorize, and hence we exclude them from Table 1.
4.2.2 Real Data Experiments
Table 2 shows the attack accuracy for correlations observed in the real distribution of datasets.
Most scenarios corresponds to X ∼ A,Y ∼ A. For Adult with A as gender and Health dataset, we
observe that the correlation corresponds to X ∼ A,Y⊥A. We set X ′ to variables based on their
correlation factors. For example, for Health dataset, all features are binarized and we use Cramer’s
V as the correlation factor where the score between ‘DaysInHospital’ and ‘gender’ is 0.09, and
thus, we deem them as uncorrelated. Among the rest of the attributes, we identify 15 attributes
that have Cramer’s V scores with gender greater than 0.15 and, hence, assign them to X ′.
The attack accuracy for logistic regression is 59 - 91% and 52 - 77% when trained with sensitive
variable (A) and without (A¯), respectively. The accuracy depends on the correlated variables X ′
and the data split of the attribute. The attack accuracy for neural networks is 63 - 96% and 51 - 93%
when trained with A and without, respectively. We observe that the attack accuracy increases with
a higher correlation between other attributes X ′ and the sensitive attribute A. The susceptibility
of our attack increases for 0:1 split. The attack on NN is higher in this case, potentially due to
memorization. Our results show that our attack gives a higher advantage of predicting the attribute
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Model Logistic Regression Neural Network
Datasets Adult Health Adult Health
Synthetic Variable A A¯ A A¯ A A¯ A A¯
X ∼ A,Y ∼ A .90 .94 .85 .97 .54 .49 .65 .61
X⊥A,Y ∼ A .95 .93 .81 .80 .57 .53 .63 .56
X ∼ A,Y⊥A .54 .53 .50 .53 .56 .53 .54 .51
X ∼ A,Y⊥A (R) .75 .63 .76 .68 .55 .50 .55 .45
Table 3: White-box attack accuracy for predicting whether the values of sensitive variable A in
Dhonest, the data of the honest party, are predominantly < 5 or > 5 while the real split in Dhonest is
33:67. A synthetic correlation with A is added to the variables X and Y depending on the specific
case. R corresponds to the setting where only 3 attributes are used for training instead of all data.
Attack accuracy based on a random guess is 0.5.
value to the adversary than the baseline random guess of 50%. These results on realistic dataset
distributions demonstrate the severity of our attack in practice.
4.2.3 Fine-grained Attack
Distribution
of A in Dhonest:
Logistic
Regression
Neural
Network
A < 5 : A > 5 A A¯ A A¯
10 : 90 .76 .69 .68 .40
30 : 70 .85 .80 .54 .54
50 : 50 .75 .88 .53 .39
70 : 30 .78 .76 .57 .42
90 : 10 .71 .80 .50 .44
The table on the right shows the results for our fine-
grained attack accuracy. In this attack, instead of just pre-
dicting which attribute value is dominant, the malicious
party tries to predict the precise distribution of the sensi-
tive attribute. For example, the row 30 : 70 corresponds
to the setting where 30% of records in Dhonest have the
value of the sensitive attribute A less than 5. Here, the
attacker tries to guess the split of 30 : 70 among five pos-
sible splits of 10 : 90, 30 : 70, etc. The baseline accuracy
is 20% because the attacker wishes to distinguish between
5 splits. As can be seen in the table, the attacker can
successfully find this information by training a meta-classifier that distinguishes between different
splits of the sensitive attribute values. Similar to observations from the synthetic and real dataset
experiments, we observe that logistic regression has higher attack accuracy than neural networks.
However, the attack accuracy for neural networks is consistently greater than the 20% baseline for
random guessing for all the distributions.
4.2.4 White-box attack
Table 3 shows the results for white-box attacks when the model parameters are accessible to the
malicious party. For logistic regressions, the results are similar to those in Table 1 for the black-box
setting. However, the attack accuracy for neural networks reduces significantly. This was also noted
in the work by [10]. One reason for this is it is hard for a naive meta-model to learn the structure
of equivalent symmetrical weights of neural networks. Indeed, one of the contribution of [10] is a
technique for identifying this symmetry.
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5 Defenses
In the previous section, we saw that removing the sensitive attribute from the dataset is not
an effective solution due to the correlations that exist between the attributes. Disentangling data
representation through variational-auto-encoders [14, 32, 5] allows one to obtain mutually indepen-
dent variables for representing the data. Intuitively, the removal of this variable before decoding the
record for further down-stream tasks would lead to better censorship. Similarly, adversarial learning
has also been proposed for learning a privacy-preserving data filter in a multi-party setting [13] and
a privacy-preserving record representation [8]. Unfortunately, such techniques do not have provable
worst-case guarantees and have been shown ineffective in the privacy context [31].
Differential privacy [7] can be applied if each party is interested in preserving record level privacy,
that is, whether a certain record is in their dataset or not. However, differential privacy does not
protect population-level properties of a dataset [7, 3]. In fact, a differentially private algorithm
with high utility aims to learn population properties that are mostly unaffected by any individual’s
data. Group differential privacy is an extension of differential privacy that considers the privacy of
a group of k correlated records where privacy guarantee drops linearly with the size of the group.
Though it can be applied to preserve privacy of all records in each party’s dataset by setting k to
the size of each party’s data, this would lead to high utility sacrifices.
In settings with more than two parties, where the attacker controls only one party, the signal
weakens as it is harder for the adversary to identify the mapping between a property and a party
whose data exhibits it. This was also noted by Melis et al. [23] in the federated learning setting
with a small number of parties.
6 Conclusion
We demonstrate leakage of attribute information from models trained in a multi-party setting.
We show that trivial defenses such as excluding a sensitive attribute during training are not enough to
prevent leakage. Our attack works on different model types, datasets that exhibit various correlation
relationships among attributes, and in settings with black- and white-box access to the joint model.
Finally, we note that existing techniques for secure computation and differential privacy are not
directly applicable to protect this form of information privacy.
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